Weekly roundup

Additional articles and reports from the past week
“IAEA Iran report” (IAEA)
The latest IAEA report on Iran cites growing concern over possible “past and current” military nuclear activities. A BBC report argues that the stronger language of the report indicates a tougher approach under new IAEA head Yukiya Amano.

“The Iran nuclear issue: the view from Beijing” (International Crisis Group)
International Crisis Group argues that despite China’s strategic and economic interests in maintaining strong ties with Iran, China prioritizes its relations with the US and will favor a “delay-and-weaken” strategy over blocking UN sanctions, especially if there is unanimous support among UNSC members.

“Consensus emerges on Iran’s centrifuges” (Arms Control Wonk)
Joshua Pollack outlines an emerging consensus in Western estimates of Iran’s centrifuge capabilities.

“Why chuckles greeted Hillary’s Gulf tour” (Daily Star)
Rami G. Khouri writes that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s warnings of an Iranian threat were plagued by a lack of credibility among Arab states.

“Will engaging Syria deal a ‘blow to Iran’? Not likely” (Syria Comment)
Joshua Landis argues against the claim that Washington’s recent diplomatic engagement of Damascus will deprive Tehran of a key ally.

“Mullahs, guards, and bonyads: an exploration of Iranian leadership dynamics” (RAND)
RAND Corporation provides an extensive overview of Iran’s formal and informal power structures. The report argues that US policymakers should deal with the existing government in Iran rather than attempt to exploit the country’s complex domestic politics.

“How a nuclear Iran fits in the grand strategies of the US, China and Russia”

“How a nuclear Iran fits in the grand strategies of the US, China and Russia”
February 9-16, 2010
     The US continues to indicate its move toward a harder line against Iran, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warning that Iran is moving toward a “military dictatorship” and claiming that Russia has agreed to support sanctions. John Vinocur believes Russia has timed its policy shift to take advantage of the Obama administration’s vulnerability on the Iranian nuclear issue and the unconcluded START treaty. Citing Russia’s newly released military doctrine (I, II, III), Vinocur speculates that Russia’s quid pro quo for cooperation on Iran involves restrictions on NATO expansion and US military defenses in Europe (New York Times).
     US Vice President Joseph Biden stated that he also expects China’s cooperation on sanctions, but Matthew Kroenig believes China and Russia see a nuclear Iran as a potential strategic asset for constraining US power in the Middle East. Kroenig argues that Chinese and Russian concern with the need to compensate for their own lack of power projection ability outweighs their economic interests in Iran or concern over nuclear proliferation. According to Kroenig, the US’ primary concern regarding proliferation is not preventing nuclear terrorism or nuclear war but maintaining its freedom to threaten or use force abroad (The New Republic).
New York Times | The New Republic

Additional link: “Military Doctrine and the Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020” (original Russian version) (Kremlin)

“Russian ambiguity dampens US expectations of support for sanctions”

“Russian ambiguity dampens US expectations of support for sanctions”
October 4-13, 2009
     Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called additional sanctions against Iran “counterproductive” after a meeting with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, apparently confirming US suspicions that Russia will resist sanctions despite comments suggesting otherwise made by President Dmitri Medvedev only 3 weeks earlier [previously covered here] (New York Times). Fred Hiatt suggests that in addition to prioritizing its commercial and military ties with Iran, Russia is exploiting the Iranian nuclear issue to maintain its dominance in the European gas market and win various concessions from the US while securing a “privileged position” with a future nuclear Iran (Washington Post).
     Citing Russia’s new $3.5-billion energy deal with China as part of efforts to oppose US global hegemony, Douglas Birch believes Moscow is deliberately maintaining an ambiguous position on Iran to extract political concessions from the US despite having “few major assets” as a global power (Associated Press). However, Kim Ghattas writes that Iran’s agreement to allow IAEA inspectors into the Qom plant and export most of its low-enriched uranium [previously covered here] has also contributed to Russia’s renewed position against sanctions. One unnamed US negotiator argues that Russia’s agreement to the uranium plan signals growing concern in Moscow over the Iranian threat (BBC).
New York Times | Washington Post | Associated Press | BBC

“Considering deterrence, extended deterrence as options against nuclear Iran”

“Considering deterrence, extended deterrence as options against nuclear Iran”
August 12-26, 2009
     In a special series on the Iranian nuclear issue, Mike Shuster writes that in light of the difficulties of preventive war demonstrated in the Iraq War, nuclear deterrence may become a central component of US policy toward a nuclear-armed Iran. Several US analysts argue that the US and Israel could deter Iran from launching nuclear attacks or providing nuclear weapons to its regional proxies, but Gary Milhollin points out that a nuclear capability will nevertheless enable Iran to project more power in the region and increase the risk of strategic miscalculations leading to armed conflict (National Public Radio).
     Shuster also discusses the possibility of US extended deterrence in the Middle East, which was recently alluded to by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton [previously covered here], as a measure not only to protect Arab allies but to prevent further proliferation should Iran obtain a nuclear weapon. Joshua Pollack notes that not only could a nuclear umbrella for Arab allies entangle the US in an unwanted regional nuclear conflict, Iran and Syria could capitalize on the situation to foment popular criticism against Arab leaders for relying on the US (National Public Radio (2)).
     David Axe details Israel’s July deployment of 3 warships into the Red Sea and acquisition of 2 new nuclear submarines, arguing that Israel is preparing for preemptive strikes against Iran while boosting its nuclear deterrent in the event that such strikes fail (World Politics Review). Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has declared that Egypt will not join any US nuclear umbrella, stating that the presence of foreign troops in Egypt and the implicit acceptance of Iran as a nuclear power are unacceptable (Global Security Newswire).
National Public Radio | National Public Radio (2) | World Politics Review | Global Security Newswire

“Critics, defenders of ’defense umbrella’ remarks argue against formal US commitments in Gulf”

“Critics, defenders of ’defense umbrella’ remarks argue against formal US commitments in Gulf”
July 27 & 28, 2009
     In an interview, Thomas W. Lippman argues that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent comments on a “defense umbrella” for Gulf allies [previously covered here] indicated a “prudent” attempt to establish unified responses to a nuclear Iran while avoiding a regional nuclear arms race. However, focusing on Saudi Arabia, Lippman argues that a formal US defense commitment would be politically costly for both Washington and Riyadh and suggests a continuation of current de facto US commitments as well as security agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council, of which Saudi Arabia is a member. Lippman also doubts that Riyadh will pursue nuclear weapons (Council on Foreign Relations).
     Emile Hokayem argues that Clinton’s ostensibly reassuring comments may have convinced Gulf allies that the US will accept a nuclear Iran. Hokayem believes that formalizing the already extensive defense relations between the US and the Gulf states will exacerbate regional tensions, arguing that Gulf leaders are satisfied with the “ambiguity” in current US security commitments and that the US should focus on a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. However, Hokayem adds that the Gulf states must devise a “serious containment and safeguard system” to deal with a “nuclear-ambiguous” Iran (The National).
     Michael Singh urges US officials to coordinate their messages on policy toward Iran and preview such messages with key allies, arguing that there is uncertainty over Washington’s commitment to imposing harsh measures against Tehran if diplomatic efforts fail. Singh attributes the inconsistencies in US signals to the need to reassure Israel and other allies concerned about US-Iran rapprochement while also convincing Iran, Russia and China that current diplomatic efforts are not simply a pretext for increased pressure in the future (Washington Institute for Near East Policy).
Council on Foreign Relations | The National | Washington Institute for Near East Policy

“Israel concerned, Arab states cautious over talks of Gulf ‘defense umbrella’”

“Israel concerned, Arab states cautious over talks of Gulf ‘defense umbrella’”
July 22-24, 2009
     Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor criticized remarks by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggesting that the US would provide a “defense umbrella” for Gulf allies to counter Iranian nuclear weapons. Meridor urged the US to focus on efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program rather than assuming Iran would eventually obtain nuclear weapons (Agence France-Presse). Nader Uskowi describes the remarks as a “radical departure” from previous US and EU policy that will inflame Iran’s leaders and encourage “hardline positions” on nuclear policy (Uskowi on Iran).
     Jumana Al Tamimi reports that officials from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab states have been “lukewarm” about the remarks (Gulf News), but in June, Tom Spender reported that military officers from the UAE and other Gulf states were receptive to proposals for a US missile defense system for Gulf Cooperation Council states (The National). Former British Ambassador to Iran Richard Dalton says the US may be unwilling to take military action to stop Iran’s nuclear program, but Dr. Mustafa Alani argues that a US defense umbrella would not prevent a destabilizing regional arms race, stating that a military attack would be preferable. However, one unnamed Arab analyst believes Gulf states are supportive of Clinton’s remarks but cannot state so publicly due to political sensitivities (The National (2)).
     Former US diplomat Hillary Mann Leverett believes US President Barack Obama’s policy of engagement with Iran has failed and that his “opponents” [Clinton] are now pushing for a different strategy. Clinton and other US officials have said the remarks were intended to dissuade Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons (Al Jazeera).
Agence France-Presse | Uskowi on Iran | Gulf News | The National | The National (2) | Al Jazeera

“US hopes to add India-Iran trade ties to arsenal against Tehran”

“US hopes to add India-Iran trade ties to arsenal against Tehran”
July 17 & 18, 2009
     As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits India, the New York Times urges New Delhi to abandon its “pretensions to nonalignment” and cooperate with the US to prevent nuclear proliferation by states such as Iran. The editorial states that if progress is not made on the Iranian nuclear issue by the September deadline issued by the G8, New Delhi should exploit its strong trade ties with Tehran to help stop the latter’s nuclear program (New York Times).
     Howard LaFranchi reports that with India providing around 40% of Iran’s gas needs, Indian firms such as Reliance Industries are being targeted for sanctions by members of the US Congress hoping to hurt Iran’s economy. LaFranchi writes that while New Delhi could use its ties with the US, Iran and Israel to facilitate Iran-US talks, the Obama administration’s efforts to strengthen relations with New Delhi could clash with such congressional efforts (Christian Science Monitor).
New York Times | Christian Science Monitor

“News agencies exaggerate Clinton’s threat of sanctions”

“News agencies exaggerate Clinton’s threat of sanctions”
July 8 & 9, 2009
     Despite previous reports that the US is not open to discussing new sanctions against Iran, in a recent interview, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “even stricter sanctions” would be pursued if the US policy of engagement failed (Reuters). Initial reports from several news agencies—including Iran’s Press TV, Israel’s Jerusalem Post and others—have quoted Clinton’s remarks without including her assertions that the US would first continue working toward engagement. Clinton also sharply criticized Tehran for suppressing domestic opposition and said that “it is not in the best interests of the world to be doing business with Iran to promote the regime” (Globovision).
     Alistair Lyon writes that Tehran’s domestic turmoil is hurting the chances for direct Iran-US engagement. The US faces the dilemma that engagement would legitimize the controversial reelection of President Ahmadinejad, which has increased international calls for new sanctions. Farideh Farhi believes Tehran may delay talks after having lost much of its negotiating power due to the recent controversies (Reuters (2)).
Reuters | Globovision | Reuters (2)